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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
JACK SYDDALL, JIMMIE JONES 
and KENNETH PERRY, 
Defenda1n.ts-Appella1n.ts. 
Case 
No.10953 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellants, Jack E. Syddall, Jimmy Jones and 
Kenneth Perry, were charged with the crime of Burglary 
in the First Degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried by jury before the Honorable 
Charles G. Cowley, Judge of the Second Judicial District 
Court, on the 21st through 23rd day of March, 1967. Upon 
the close of the State's case in chief, the trial court grant-
ed defendants' Motion to Dismiss the charge of Bur-
glary in the First Degree, but denied defendants' Mo-
tion to dismiss the included offenses. The case was sub-
mitted to the jury, which returned a verdict of guilty 
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of the crrme of Burglary in the Second Degree. On 
March 31st, 1967, the trial judge sentenced all defendants 
to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate sentences 
provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants seek reversal of the conviction and 
the judgment thereon. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants in this case were caught in the act of 
attempting to break into the vault of the Clearfield State 
Bank. The Clearfield State Bank was adjacent to the 
Lockhart Company building, which in turn was adjacent 
to the building occupied by the Barlow Furniture 
Company. The buildings did not have common walls. 
They were separate buildings, side by side in a row, but 
each with its own walls. Lockhart was south of Bar-
low's and the bank was south of Lockhart (Plaintiff's 
Ex. A, B, C, F; Tr. 70-71). 
The evidence showed that the defendants had broken 
into the Barlow Furniture building and then, by knocking 
a hole through the wall of that building and the wall of 
the Lockhart Company, gained access to the Lockhart 
Company building. They then removed a portion of the 
separate walls of the Lockhart Company and of the bank 
building, exposing the vault in the bank which they ap-
parently were about to drill and blast when they were 
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interrupted by the police. The vault backed flush against 
the hole made in the bank wall, so that the defendants, 
when arrested, had not "entered" the bank (Plaintiff's 
Ex. B; Tr. 72). Received in evidence at the trial were 
the items the defendants had with them. These were 
more than ordinary burglary tools. They were special 
"safe cracking" tools, including special drills to make 
holes in the vault, dynamite to put in the holes, plastic 
dough to seal in the dynamite, and electric wire, detona-
tor caps and batteries to explode the dynamite (Plain-
tiff's Ex. E; Tr. 52-53). The explosives don't show on 
the list of exhibits as counsel stipulated to them (Tr. 61). 
The testimony in the record clearly indicates that the 
defendants had no interest whatsoever in taking any-
thing from the Lockhart Company. Nothing was dis-
turbed except what was necessary to gain access to the 
"\rnll next to the bank. A small vault was ignored despite 
the fact that it was in plain view and the defendants had 
ample tools to open it (Tr. 77, 103-105). 
The testimony regarding Barlow Furniture like·wise 
indicated that the store was not ransacked (Tr. 77, 78). 
The State, as an afterthought, did recall the owner to tes-
tify that some coins that were in an open cash drawer 
were missing (Tr. 124). However, there was no evidence 
that any of the defendants, who were caught at the 
scene, had taken the coins. A desperation attempt to 
mislead the jury by having an officer testify that one of 
the defendants had $20.47 in "coinage" at the jail (Tr. 
128), failed when it was brought out that the amount 
included currency and coins, and the officer did not know 
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how much of each there was (Tr. 129). Prior to the 
time the loss was noticed at least fifteen other people had 
been through the building (Tr. 79, 125). 
The evidence of an intent to steal from the Clear-
field State Bank was overwhelming. Two of the defend-
ants had been seen "casing" the bank two days earlier 
(Tr. 15-17). The police and sheriff had prior knowl-
edge that the burglary of the bank was planned (Tr. 83-
85). At the time the police closed in, work was pro-
gressing on the bank vault and all the tools were found 
around that area (Tr. 77-78). Further, the tools were 
of a type designed to drill cement (Tr. 78), which was 
the material used in the bank vault. The admission of 
appellant Perry that his expected share from the "job" 
was "30 grand" (Tr. 96), certainly ref erred to the bank 
as the intended source. In the words of the prosecutor 
who tried the case, "to be perfectly frank, the greater 
part, and the massive part of the evidence, is that their 
intent was to break in the bank" (R. 73 at pg. 4). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
APPELLANTS' CONVICTION IS INVALID 
BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT GIVEN A PRE-
LIMINARY HEARING NOR NOTICE OF THE 
ACCUSATION OF THE CRIME OF WHICH 
THEY WERE ULTIMATELY CONVICTED. 
It is obvious that the defendants could have been 
convicted of attempted first-degree burglary of the bank. 
A charge of completed burglary of the bank would uot 
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lie because their attempt was interrupted by the police 
before the bank was entered (Tr. 72). No charge of first-
degree burglary, complete or attempted, would lie as to 
Lockhart or Barlow, because explosives were not to be 
used in them. The State, however, did charge the de-
fendants with a completed act of first-degree burglary. 
It did this by combining in a single charge the explosives 
intended for the bank with the actual entry of Barlow and 
Lockhart, by charging burglary in the first degree by 
entering Lockhart and Barlow, but with the intent being 
to commit larceny by use of explosives in the bank. 
The original Information got in the way by stating 
that the intent for entering Barlow and Lockhart was to 
commit larceny "therein" (R 24). To cure this, the State 
brought a motion to delete the word "therein," so as not 
to limit the proof to Lockhart and Barlow. At the hear-
ing on this motion, the State candidly admitted "The ma-
jor part of the evidence will indicate that the intent was 
to commit larceny in Clearfield Bank. So the word 
'therein' would limit the meaning of the Information" 
(R. 73, pg. 3). 
In answer to the court's inquiry about whether that 
was a change in the charge upon which defendants were 
hound over, the State's attorney alleged that the charge 
had always been intent to steal from the Clearfield Bank 
and, ''I know there was no evidence adduced [at the pre-
liminary hearing] relating to the intent to commit lar-
ceny any other place other than the Clearfield State 
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Bank" (R. 73, pg. 5). The preliminary hearings were 
not recorded, so have no transcript. 
Admittedly, the intent to commit larceny in the 
Clearfield State Bank was never specified literally in the 
written pleadings. Nonetheless, defendants were cer-
tainly led to believe that they were accused of intending 
to commit larceny in the bank, when that was the sole 
evidentiary basis for the bindover, and the claim of the 
State's attorney in open court. 
Defendant's counsel accordingly prepared for trial 
on the following theories (subsequently proven correct) : 
First, the charge of first-degree burglary would fail be-
cause there was no completed burglary of the bank, and 
an intent to use explosives on the bank didn't prove first-
degree burglary of Barlow or Lockhart because as to 
them, proof of burglary requires proof of an intent to 
commit the acts within the buildings entered; Second, the 
lesser offenses of second- or third-degree burglary of 
Barlow and Lockhart would fail because there was no 
proof of any actual or intended burglary of them. The 
trial court agreed with the former theory and dismissed 
the charge of first-degree burglary of Lockhart and Bar-
low. The State has not appealed this ruling. As to the 
latter theory, concerning the lesser offenses, the court 
let second-degree burglary go to the jury because the 
State, after calling and releasing the owner of Barlow's 
as a witness, recalled him to testify that some coins had 
been taken from his store (Tr. 124, 125). 
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This was a new charge. Previously the evidence, and 
elements of law, had been concerned with the intent to 
steal from the bank. Neither preliminary hearing, nor 
any stage of the proceedings to that point, had given any 
intimation to defendants that the State would try to 
prove an actual or intended theft from Barlow or Lock-
hart. The new State's evidence came rather late in the 
trial. The previous witnesses had been examined by de-
fendants as to whether or not there was an actual entry 
of the bank, or whether or not explosives were used at 
Barlow or Lockhart. Now a new element was in the case. 
There had been no examination of the witnesses on this 
new element and these witnesses were now excused. 
These were the investigating police officers and the 
aggrieved parties, and of course defendants did not dare 
call them as their own witnesses without the right of 
cross-examination. The new element was whether or not 
the defendants took the coins, or whether, between 9 :00 
p.m., when the defendants entered, and the next business 
day, when Mr. Barlow found the coins were missing, 
other persons, such as policemen, newspapermen, insur-
ance men, employees, friends, neighbors, spectators, or 
the curious might have had the opportunity to take the 
coins. If it is claimed that a person steals a missing 
item, but that missing item is not traced to him in any 
way, the fact that many other people also had the oppor-
tunity to take it, makes the evidence less than clear and 
convincing that the accused took it. The defendants did 
the best they could with the witnesses that the State had 
left to call, but were not able to cover this issue ade-
quately. 
7 
The effect of the above was that appellants were 
never given a preliminary hearing on the issue as it 
went to the jury and were not given notice of the crime 
of which they were convicted. Following the amendment 
made in district court, defense counsel declined an offer 
to remand for another preliminary hearing, but this was 
an offer for another preliminary hearing based on the 
Clearfield State Bank (R. 73). Certainly defendants 
could not have waived their right to preliminary hearing 
on the new charge when they were not even aware of it 
until near the close of the State's case. 
The situation in the instant case is similar to that 
in State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 96 Pac. 1085 (1908). In 
that case, the defendant had been bound over on a charge 
of fornication. The Information was quashed because 
of the statute of limitations, but a new Information was 
filed alleging a more recent date and the defendant was 
convicted. This court reversed on the ground that no 
evidence of the act of which defendant was convicted was 
presented at the preliminary hearing. The court stated 
that a person cannot be bound over on one crime and 
convicted of another even though they may be similar -
in that case, the same parties and the same act at a dif-
ferent time. 
Not only were appellants deprived of their prelimi-
nary hearing but also the right ''to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against" them. Utah Const. 
Art. I, Sec. 12. Appellanfa rely upon State v. Myers, 5 
Utah 2d 365, 302 P.2d 276 (1956). In that case, the prose-
cution, in a bill of particulars, had committed itself to a 
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total value of less than $50.00 of property taken from a 
victim in one count of a grand larceny Information, while 
alleging over $50.00 taken from another victim in another 
count. At trial, the State proved over $50.00 on the first 
and was unable to prove the second. The conviction was 
reversed because of the fatal variance. In that case the 
State undoubtedly argued that all they had done was 
switch the amounts and the victims and the defendant 
was convicted on evidence that would support the charge 
of grand larceny. The court reasoned it was not fair to 
lull the defendant into a sense of security by alleging one 
count they could not prove and another that was not a 
felony and then changing the situation at trial. The 
court stated the provisions of §77-21-43, UCA, 1953, (var-
iance between pleading and proof) do not overrule the 
requirements of the constitution. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFI-
CIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF 
SECOND-DEGREE BURGLARY OF THE 
BARLOW FURNITURE COMP ANY AND THE 
LOCKHART COMPANY. 
The ruling of the trial court that burglary requires 
an intent to commit larceny within the building entered is 
amply supported by the authorities cited in defendants' 
brief submitted to that court. Since the State has not 
appealed that ruling, appellants will not re-argue that 
question here. 
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It is obvious that the State set out to prove, and did 
prove attempted first-degree burglary of the bank. This 
was not charged. Being precluded from a conviction of 
that crime, the State got a conviction for another crime 
which was not proven - burglary of Lockhart and Bar-
low. Defendants contend that the jury did not have suf-
ficient evi<lence upon which to find them guilty, but that 
the jury was motivated by a desire "to do justice" in 
the face of the evidence that the defendants were com-
mitting a serious crime although not the one charged. 
Only the State presented evidence. Its evidence 
pointed to a professionally planned and executed at-
tempt to burglarize the bank. The defendants broke into 
Barlow's around 9 :30 p.m. (Tr. 34), and by 10 :20 p.m. 
(Tr. 73) had pierced two groups of walls made up of lay-
ers of brick and masonry (Ex. B, C, F; R. 69, 70, 71). 
This State's evidence shows an intensity of labor of 
phenomenal proportions that bespeaks only a single-
minded purpose to get into the bank vault as quickly as 
possible. They anticipated a reward of $30,000.00 each 
(Tr. 96), and made no effort to burglarize safes, draw-
ers or cash registers in Barlow or Lockhart (Tr. 77, 78, 
103-105). 
The State did show that approximately $15.00 to 
$17.00 in nickels, dimes and quarters was stolen from a 
cash register which had been left open by management 
of Barlow Furniture (Tr. 124). This testimony was given 
by Mr. Barlow, owner of the store. He had previously 
been called and released as a State's witness. He was 
then recalled for this purpose. The complex of buildings 
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had been surrounded by the Police before the defendants 
were called on to surrender and no defendant left the 
building prior to their arrest. They were searched at 
the scene and again when they went to the jail. The coins 
were never found. The record is not clear on when Mr. 
Barlow discovered the loss of the coins, but apparently it 
was a long time after the apprehension of the defendants. 
During that time a number of other people had been in 
the Barlow Furniture store (Tr. 79, 125). Accordingly, 
the defendants might or might not have taken the coins. 
There is no proof that they did. Although inferential and 
based on common sense, it would seem that none of the 
defendants saw or touched the coins for several reasons. 
First, they were after the vault and working hard on that 
job. Second, the coins apparently were removed from 
the premises, as they were never recovered. The de-
fendants couldn't have done this. Third, $15.00 to $17.00 
in small change adds up to a very large pocketfull. De-
spite this, and despite the fact that although not imme-
diately, but within the next day, the police were aware 
of the disappearance of the coins, the arresting officers 
and jailer failed to connect the coins with any of the de-
fendants, which is remarkable if any of the defendants 
had had possession of them. The State apparently was 
aware of the weakness of this point because, in an effort 
to mislead the jury, an officer testified that one of the de-
fendants had $20.47 in "coinage" at the jail (Tr. 128). 
This effort failed, or even boomeranged, when it was 
brought out that the officer had counted the money the 
defendant had on him, but couldn't testify that he had 
more than $.47 in change and that the rest might have 
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been currency. If the defendant had had that sum of 
change, it is most probable that the officer would have 
noted it on the booking envelope in which the defendant's 
possessions were put, or that it \Vould have been picked 
up subsequently in the envelope when Mr. Barlow re-
ported it (Tr.128, 129). The defendants were searched at 
the scene. The officer making the search would have felt 
the large hard bulge the coins would make, investigate, 
find and report them. Yet there is no evidence connecting 
the coins to the defendants. 
That the jury convicted on this evidence, only indi-
cates that the good jurors of Davis County were reluctant 
to turn the defendants loose on society because of a 
"technicality," to wit, that they were charged with the 
wrong crime. However, as this court stated in State v. 
Ta.ylor, 14 Utah 2d 107, 378 P.2d 107 (1963). 
In a criminal proceeding it is not sufficient to 
show merely that the accused has been dishonest, 
or that he is a cheater, or otherwise of bad char-
acter. He is entitled to be charged with a specific 
crime so that he may know the "nature and cause 
of the accusation against him," and the State 
must prove substantially as charged the offense 
it relies upon for conviction. 
The judgment must stand or fall upon the 
proof, or lack thereof, of the crime which the 
State charged the defendant, essayed to prove, 
and of which lie stands convicted .... 
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If the appellants are to serve prison sentences for 
attempting to burglarize the bank, they should be charged 
and convicted of that crime. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Kenneth Perry, 
Defendant-Appellant 
JOHN D. 0 'CONNELL 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Jack E. Syddall 
and Jimmie Jon,es, 
Defendarnts-Appellarn,ts 
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